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RESUMEN
La Constitución de la República Federal del Brasil de 1988 estableció un conjunto de competencias 
privativas del Tribunal Supremo Federal para ejercer el control jurisdiccional. Consagra un tribunal 
competente para decidir las acciones abstractas de inconstitucionalidad contra la mayoría de las 
disposiciones legales, independientemente de las situaciones específicas a las que se aplican. Este 
sistema concentrado de control jurisdiccional coexiste con la simultaneidad de los dos modelos 
tradicionales. El artículo desarrolla la ideología judicial que domina el discurso de la Corte Suprema el cual 
se mantiene fiel a la imagen de Kelsen de ser un "legislador negativo".
ABSTRACT
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil of 1988 established a set of powers exclusives of Federal 
Supreme Court to exercise judicial review. The Constitutions contains a competent tribunal to decide the 
constitutionality of abstract actions against most of the laws, regardless of the specific situations that apply. 
This concentrate judicial system coexists with the simultaneity of the two traditional models. This article 
develops the judicial ideology that dominates the discourse of the Supreme Court which remains faithful to 
the image of Kelsen to be a "negative legislator”.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Control constitucional en Brasil, legislados negativo, modelo kelseniano, judicial review, sistema 
concentrado.
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INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS
One of the main topics proposed for discussion in the 18th International Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law is the legislative role of Constitutional Courts in contemporary democracies. 
The Brazilian state, like many of those from the Iberic and Latin-American tradition, can be characterized as 
a mixed legal system which attempts to reconcile a model of diffused and incidenter tantun judicial review 
with a concentrated and abstract model where the Constitutional Court pronounces abstract decisions in 
direct actions of unconstitutionality. These decisions have erga omnes and strictly binding effects.
1 Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom.
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Prior to the Constitution of 1988, the Brazilian 
system of judicial review was closer to the American 
tradition of judicial review than to the Austrian model 
developed by Hans Kelsen, which concentrates   
the jurisdiction on constitutional matters in a     
single Constitutional Court. The declaration of 
unconstitutionality was merely a step to be followed 
by any ordinary the judge in the justification            
of her decision. Even though a dispute over the 
constitutionality of an Act could eventually reach the 
high courts by means of an appeal, there was no 
warranty that this would ever happen. 
Although there was an abstract action for assessing 
the constitutionality of statutes before the Federal 
Supreme Court, the scope of this action was very 
strict and only the General-Attorney of the Republic 
(who was at the same time the Procurator of the 
Federal Government and the Chief of the Public 
Ministry) was empowered to bring it before           
the Supreme Court. In a legal system where the 
General-Attorney of the Republic was directly 
subordinated to the President of the Republic and 
where the Executive Administration was authorized 
to legislate in place of the Congress in a wide range 
of areas, like Brazil was at the time of the Military 
Dictatorships of the three decades which antedated 
the Constitution of 1988, that sort of action was of 
3very little utility.
These brief historical considerations help one 
understand the roots of the current Brazilian system 
of constitutional jurisdiction. They explain, for 
instance, the fact that any judge in the country is 
competent to decide a constitutional issue. The 
general competence to adjudicate on constitutional 
issues has its origins in such historical tradition. 
Nonetheless, the Constitution of 1988, in spite of 
keeping the incidental system of judicial review, was 
deliberately designed to break down with this 
tradition. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is partly 
inspired by the Kelsenian ideas that a decision 
which pronounces the unconstitutionality is not 
declaratory, but rather constitutive; that there can be 
no “unconstitutional” statute in the sense of a null 
and void piece of legislation, but only a statute 
“contrary to the Constitution” which can be 
derogated by the Constitutional Courts through       
a special procedure that is different from         
ordinary legislation; and that as a general rule       
the Constitutional Court pronounces erga omnes 
decisions creating a derogatory rule which 
eliminates a previous norm incompatible with       
the Constitution (in such a way that the court is a 
negative legislator). These ideas have a deep 
influence in the institutional settings of the Brazilian 
state and the doctrines about the relationship 
between the Legislative and the Justiciary. 
The Constitution of 1988, although without naming 
the Federal Supreme Court a “Constitutional  
Court”, placed that court in a special position        
and established a set of privative competences       
to exercise the judicial review. The court is              
now competent to decide abstract actions of 
unconstitutionality against most statutory 
provisions, regardless of any specific situations to 
which they are applied. Such direct actions can be 
brought before the court by a relatively vast group of 
entities which represent general sectors of the 
society.
This concentrated system of judicial review coexists 
with the historical model of incidental and diffused 
constitutional adjudication. The simultaneity of the 
two traditional models is one of the distinctive 
features of the Brazilian system of judicial review. 
Even though the judicial ideology that dominates 
the discourse of the Supreme Court remains faithful 
to Kelsen's image of the Constitutional Court as no 
more than a “negative legislator”, our analysis will 
show that there are occasions in which it effectively 
acts as a positive law-making agency, albeit strictly 
bound to the constitution and sensitive to its judicial 
3 In the previous Brazilian Constitution there was no distinction between the General Attorney of the Republic and the General-Advocate of the 
Union. The separation between the Public Ministry (headed by the former) and the General Advocacy of the Union (headed by the latter) is one 
of the Union important changes in the institutional setting of the republic undertaken by the novel Constitution. By means of this distinction, the 
“public interest” is differentiated from the “interest of the Government” not merely from a rhetorical point of view. The Constitution has created 
a legal office subordinate to the President the competence of which is to defend the interests of the Federal Government and an autonomous 
office the competence of which is to protect the rule of law, the public estates, the fundamental legal rights and other collective or “diffused 
rights” such as the protection of the environment. For a brief comment on the Public Ministry after the Constitution of 1988, see infra, note 12.
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role. In fact, one can easily agree that the Brazilian 
Constitution expressly requires the Court to lay 
down general and abstract norms which sometimes 
are hierarchically ranked in the same level of the 
ordinary legislation. In order to justify this assertion, 
we will analyse the Brazilian system of judicial 
review by separating the incidental and diffused 
review from the abstract and concentrated one.
1. THE DIFFUSED AND INCIDENTAL 
SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The model of incidental and concrete judicial review 
remains applicable in Brazil and constitutes one of 
the central features of the Brazilian legal tradition. It 
is a concrete form of judicial review because the 
unconstitutionality of a norm (no matter where it can 
find its sources: in a statute, in an international 
treaty, in an administrative decree, in a conventional 
norm within a contract etc.) is argued by one of the 
parties in the course of an ordinary legal dispute. As 
opposed to most European countries which have a 
Constitutional Court, the judge must decide the 
constitutional issue herself. The decision about the 
(un)constitutionality of the norms is a necessary 
step that the judge has to take before reaching her 
conclusion. Further to being a concrete system of 
judicial review, this is also a system of diffused 
judicial review because the constitutional 
jurisdiction is spread out through the court system. 
Every court in Brazil has constitutional jurisdiction. 
When the unconstitutionality is argued before a first-
instance judge, there is no need for any special 
formalities, except for giving the other party the 
chance to counter the arguments advanced for the 
declaration of unconstitutionality. The Constitutional 
Court does not have a say on the issue unless the 
case reaches it by an extraordinary appeal that only 
is admissible after a final second-instance decision 
is pronounced.
When the unconstitutionality is argued before          
a court of appeal or any other highcourt, the 
constitutional issue can only be decided in a plenary 
session of the court. The reporter judge must 
suspend the judgment of the case until a decision on 
the constitutional query is achieved by the majority 
4of the full house.
Nevertheless, the rule which establishes this 
privative competence to the plenary sitting of the 
courts does not avoid contradictory decisions. The 
Brazilian judicial system is heavily fragmented, for 
several reasons. First, Brazil is a federal state 
constituted by 26 States and one Autonomous 
District where the headquarters of the Federal 
Government are situated. Each State has its own 
courts and very rarely a precedent from a different 
court of appeal of the same hierarchy is quoted in a 
state court. Second, there are different and 
completely autonomous court systems whose 
competences are determined according to the 
subject matters of the cases: there is a Federal 
Court system (which decides issues of interest of 
the Federation or of its subsidiaries, such as 
autarchies, public enterprises, public foundations, 
Federal Universities etc.), an Electoral Court 
system (which has administrative competences for 
organizing the general elections; normative 
authority to issue general norms supplementing the 
electoral legislation and jurisdictional competences 
over a vast range controversies around the 
application of electoral law – for instance, cases 
about limits of the freedom of expression, unlawful 
political advertisements, abuses of economic power 
in the elections etc.), a Labour Court system (which 
decides labour cases and is informed by the 
principle of the protection of the employees against 
the dominant position of their employers), a   
Military Court system (for Military Crimes), and the 
General State Courts (which have jurisdiction on all 
remaining subjects, such as civil disputes in general 
and criminal cases in which the Federation is not a 
victim or an interested party).
When there is no binding precedent applicable to a 
case, there is no procedural mechanism enabling a 
party or a judge to submit the constitutional issue to 
the Supreme Court before a decision is reached in 
the ordinary courts. Apart from exceptional cases 
which will be dealt with later in this report, the 
technique of avocamiento, which is admitted in 
4  da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 97.Constituição
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some Latin American countries, does not find an 
equivalent in Brazil. Only final decisions from the 
ordinary courts can be challenged by an 
“extraordinary appeal” (recurso extraordinario) to 
the Federal Supreme Court. These extraordinary 
appeals are admitted to decide constitutional 
controversies. They can neither re-examine the 
evidence or any question of fact nor adjudicate on   
a question of interpretation of infra-constitutional 
laws.
The issue of the unconstitutionality of any statute, 
international treaty, legislative decree or 
administrative resolution which establishes a 
general norm can be brought before the Supreme 
Court via a recurso extraordinario, although there 
are some procedural barriers aimed at filtering the 
5number of appeals to the Federal Supreme Court.
The amount of discretion of the court in choosing the 
appeals it will decide is relatively low. Until relatively 
recently there was nearly no discretion (all the 
cases which fulfill all procedural requirements 
where submitted to the court), but a recent 
Constitutional Amendment has determined that 
only cases of “general repercussion” (repercussão 
6geral) can be submitted to the court.  The basic idea 
is that only cases which reflect upon the status of 
positive law in a relevant way should be decided     
by the court. The main purpose of the appeals to       
the Supreme Court is not to protect individual 
situations, but rather to unify the interpretation of 
valid law. To decide whether or not an issue is of 
“general repercussion” it is necessary a judgment of 
the plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court 
(which is constituted by eleven Ministers). It is in the 
case law of the Court that one will find the criteria for 
identifying such cases. Nevertheless, once a party 
demonstrates that her case fits the constitutional 
definition of a case of “general repercussion”, she 
has a constitutional right to see her case decided by 
the court.
As a rule, the incidental declaration of unconstitutio-
nality of a provision or an act neither is strictly 
binding nor has erga omnes effect. According to the 
wording of the Constitution, or an incidenter tantum 
decision to become universally efficacious the 
Federal Senate must pass a resolution derogating 
7that norm.  The Federal Supreme Court, when 
reaching a definitive decision recognizing the 
unconstitutionality of a legal provision, notifies the 
Senate, which will have discretion on whether or not 
the norm should be formally abrogated. 
Nonetheless, in spite of this constitutional provision, 
the practice of the Senate is to avoid eliminating 
particular legal provisions declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court. 
This does not mean, however, that the final 
decisions of the Supreme Court are not 
authoritative. Even though as a rule the decisions of 
the courts have inter partes efficacy, constitutional 
precedents are of fundamental importance in the 
5 Some of these requisites are established in legislation, such as the need to discuss the constitutionality of a law as an incidental question before 
the lower courts. It is a burden of the appellant to formulate an argument for the unconstitutionality of the normative act and to assure that the 
court explicitly expresses an opinion on the constitutional issues. If the court remains silent after a claim of unconstitutionality is raised by a 
party, it is up to this party to request a clarifying pronouncement (Embargo de Declaração) over the constitutionality of the norm within 5 days of 
the publication of the decision. A thesis that was not discussed by the lower courts can not reach the Supreme Court unless if that Court leaves 
the incidental claim of unconstitutionality undecided after being warned by the interested party (See STF: Sumula 356). This requisite seems 
reasonable and is quite accepted by the constitutional lawyers, although it requires some special argumentative techniques that are not always 
dominated by general practitioners. There are, however, serious problems which refer to other requisites that are not established in any law and 
that do not find any statutory justification. The court creates a filter to diminish the number of cases under its jurisdiction. In this sense, there is a 
chain of precedents ruling that an extraordinary appeal can not be brought before the Supreme Court in order to protect the principle of Legality 
(or, in other words, the rule that “no one shall be obliged to do or to refrain from something unless by order of a law” – Constituição da Republica 
Federativa do Brasil: art. 5th, II). This principle contains a prohibition for administrative authorities to create general norms other than in the 
situations explicitly authorized either by the Constitution or by a statute. The case law of the Supreme Court, however, created a constraint 
establishing that the violation of the Constitution which opens the way to an extraordinary appeal must be “direct and frontal”, that is, must be 
assessed merely by comparing the unconstitutional act with the Constitution. There is in fact a judge-made rule stating that “extraordinary 
appeals are inadmissible to remediate a violation of the principle of legality whenever its verification presupposes to revise the interpretation 
given by the court of origin to the infra-constitutional legislation” (STF: Sumula 636).
6 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, § 3rd, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th 
December 2004.
7 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 52, X.
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Brazilian legal system. If we stick to the 
classification of the institutional force of judicial 
precedents adopted by one of the authors of this 
report in a previous writing, who distinguishes three 
categories of normativity for judicial precedents 
(precedents “binding in a strong sense”, precedents 
“binding in a weak sense” and precedents “merely 
persuasive”), we can place this sort of case law in 
the intermediate category and characterize it at 
8least as “binding in a weak sense.”
As we will see later in this report, there is a clear 
trend of increasing substantially the normative 
powers of the Supreme Court in the decisions of 
unconstitutionality, regardless of whether they are 
pronounced in the course of a legal dispute or in a 
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality.
Some signs of this trend are the recent 
constitutional and legislative reforms that enhanced 
the binding character of the decisions of the court. 
However, before examining these law reforms we 
will outline some of the aspects of the concentrated 
system of constitutional review.
2. THE CONCENTRATED SYSTEM OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW
2.1. Concentrated constitutional jurisdiction 
9by direct actions
The concentrated system of judicial review in Brazil 
was inspired by the systems from European 
countries like Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal. Nevertheless, there are some specific 
features which distinguish the Brazilian model. 
There are four basic types of direct and abstract 
actions of unconstitutionality in Brazil: the Direct 
Action of Unconstitutionality (Ação Direta de 
10Inconstitucionalidade);  the Declaratory Action of 
Constitutionality of a federal law or normative act 
11(Acao Declaratória de Constitucionalidade);  the 
Direct Action Against an Unconstitutional Omission 
(Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por 
12Omissão);  and the Claim Against the Disrespect  
to a Fundamental Precept (Argüição de 
13Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental).  All 
these actions have a limited group of authorities or 
entities that can figure as claimants, which will be 
specified below. In any direct form of constitutional 
review, the General Advocate of the Union 
(Advogado-Geral da União) will be heard in defense 
of the normative act. By the same token, the 
General-Attorney of the Republic will have a chance 
to present a memorandum when he is not the author 
14    of the action. Let us outline some of the features of 
these actions.
a)  The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality;
The direct action of unconstitutionality is the main 
instrument by means of which the Supreme Court 
adjudicates on a general impugnation of the validity 
8 See Thomas Bustamante, “Precedent in Brazil” in E. Hondius (ed.), Precedent and the Law – Reports to the XVIIth Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law, Utrecht, 16-22 July 2006, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, pp. 289-309. A general theory of precedent which is applicable 
to the Brazilian legal system can be found in Thomas Bustamante, Teoria do Precedente: A justificação e a aplicação de regras jurisprudenciais, 
São Paulo, Malheiros, forthcoming.
9 In short, a direct action is defined as a form of abstract constitutional review. The constitutionality of the norm is itself the object of the claim, 
for there is no concrete right considered by the court in the decision. A direct claim of unconstitutionality must not deal with any subjective or 
concrete situation. Its concern is the general validity of a norm, not its applicability. 
10 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 102, I, “a.”
11 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 102, I, “a.”
12 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, § 2nd.
13 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, § 1st.
14 The Advogado Geral da União and the Procurador Geral da Republica should not be confused. The former is the head of the General Advocacy 
of the Union and defends interests of the Federal Governement and of the Union, considered as a political entity of the Federation. He is 
subordinated to the President of the Republic and his main task is to represent the Union and act as a procurator of the Federal Government. The 
latter, in turn, is the head of the Public Ministry, which is an autonomous institution – not subordinated to any administrative, legislative or 
judicial authority – constituted by public prosecutors whose role is to protect the “public interest” and the rule of law in its broad sense. The 
Constitution of 1988 places the Public Ministry in a special position in Brazil's institutional design. In addition to having the monopoly of the 
initiative of criminal procedures in general (apart from some rare exceptions defined in the Criminal Code), this institution is the main body of 
the Republic when it comes to controlling the legality of the administrative action. For the Constitutional definition of the competences of the 
General-Advocacy of the Union and the institutional functions of the Public Ministry, see: Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 
131 ff (for the General-Advocacy of the Union) and art 129 ff (for the Public Ministry). For more on the structure and the institutional functions of 
the Brazilian Public Ministery, see: Hugo Nigro Mazzilli, Regime Jurídico do Ministério Publico, 6th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2007. 
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of a legal diploma or any particular statutory 
provision. Any general normative act from a Federal 
source or a State source can be challenged by a 
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (henceforth 
ADIN, which stands for the Portuguese words  
15“Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade”).  Among 
the federal norms are included the normative acts 
which internalize the Treaties that the Brazilian 
Republic celebrates with foreign nations.
There are, however, a few norms left outside the 
scope of this constitutional action. The Supreme 
Court, on the basis of a relatively weak argument, 
has held that legislative acts which have been 
passed before the promulgation of the Constitution 
cannot be reviewed by an ADIN. A distinction was 
drawn between an unconstitutional provision –   
that is, a provision produced in violation of the 
Constitution – and an ancient law which was not 
received by the new Constitution. Even though both 
of these laws are to be repealed by the Courts, the 
case law establishes that a collision between a pre-
constitutional act and the Constitution should be 
resolved in the light of concrete cases, according   
to the principles of inter-temporal law (that is, 
according to the principle “lex posterior derogat 
priori”). Even though the courts (including, of 
course, the Supreme Court) may depart from laws 
which were implicitly abrogated by the Constitution 
(for there has been no reception of these laws), they 
should do so not on the grounds that such laws are 
unconstitutional, but rather on the assumption that 
they belong to an old legal system that no longer 
exists, since a new Constitution necessarily 
16inaugurates a new juristic order.  Because of      
this technicality, a large set of laws enacted prior to 
the Constitution of 1988 are immune from direct 
17constitutional review.
Furthermore, apart from the “pre-constitutional” 
statutes, laws of “concrete effects” – that is, 
normative acts “which have a clearly delimitated 
object and a clear set of addressees” and thus can 
be considered laws only in a formal sense, for they 
18“do not discipline abstract juridical relations”   – can 
not be challenged by an ADIN, and neither can any 
acts which have been already derogated by 
19Congress.
As ruled by the Constitution, the following 
authorities are legitimized to bring an ADIN before 
the Supreme Court: the President of the Republic, 
15 The Brazilian Federation is formed by the Federal Union, the States and a large number of Municipalities which are autonomous entities that 
have their own governments and their own legislative assemblies. The general view among Brazilian constitutional lawyers is that such entities 
are autonomous members of the Federation. Notwithstanding that fact, the constitutional provision which regulates the ADIN does not include 
Municipal laws among those acts which can be challenged by this form of direct action. There are pragmatic reasons for that: in the year of 2006, 
there were 5,564 Municipalities in the Brazilian territory (source: http://www.culturatura.com.br/brasil/, visited on 10 September 2009). It 
would be practically impossible for a single court constituted by 11 judges to exert direct constitutional jurisdiction over such a large number of 
legislative bodies. It is important to note, however, that the fact that the Supreme Court is not competent to adjudicate on ADINs against 
municipal laws does not eliminate the possibility of analyzing a claim of unconstitutionality of such statutes by means of an extraordinary 
appeal. Most of the unconstitutional municipal laws are, however, repealed by the State Courts instead of the Federal Supreme Court.
16 See: STF, Rp. 946, Rel. Min. Xavier de Albuquerque, RTJ, 82 (1)/44; Rp. 1012, Rel. Min.Moreira Alves, RTJ, 95 (3)/990. This case law, in spite of 
being very old, is constantly renewed by novel decisions of the court. See: STF, AI 386.830-AgR-ED-Edv-Agr-Ed, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello, DJ de 4-
02-2005.
17 The roots of this jurisprudence lie in a sort of Kelsenian orthodoxy. In his General Theory of Law and State, Kelsen explains the reception of 
ancient laws by a novel constitution in this way: “If laws which were introduced under the old constitution 'continue to be valid' under the new 
constitution, this is possible only because validity has expressly or tacitly been vested in them by the new constitution. (…) The new order 
'receives,' i. e. adopts, norms from the old order; this means that the new order gives validity to (puts into force) norms which have the same 
content of the old order” (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 117). When Kelsen holds 
that the new order created by a Constitution provides a new basis for the validity to norms of the old order, he appears to be denying the 
possibility of a conflict between an ancient law and the new constitution (since the non-received norms belong to a different legal order). One 
should notice, however, that Kelsen is merely providing a theoretical explanation of the creation of a new legal system, not giving any 
recommendation to the Constitutional Court. We have plenty of reasons to doubt that Kelsen himself would maintain that, in a legal system in 
which all the laws are submitted to direct forms of judicial review, the old and anachronical laws which defy the constitution should be excluded 
from constitutional jurisdiction. We hope that the Court finds a way out of this jurisprudence in the years to come. Meanwhile, a solution to 
minimize this problem can be provided by recent statutes which regulated the Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept, which is a 
direct action subsidiary to the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality. This solution, however, would not eliminate the problem, since not all 
constitutional provisions can constitute a parameter for that claim (see below, subsection 2.1, “c”).
18 For a comment on the topic and a detailed analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court, see: Gilmar Mendes, Inocencio M. Coelho and Paulo 
G. Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 2.ed, Sao Paulo: Saraiva, 2008, p. 1.117.
19 STF, ADI 647, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 27-3-1992, p. 3.801.
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the Governing Boards of the Federal Senate or of 
the Chamber of Deputies, the Governing Boards of 
the Legislative Assemblies of the Federal States, 
the Governors of the States, the General-Attorney 
of the Republic (Procurador Geral da Republica), 
the Federal Section of the Brazilian Association of 
Advocates (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil), any 
Political Party represented in Congress and any 
20national Union or class-representing association.
b)  The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality
The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 
(henceforth ADC, which stands for the     
Portuguese sentence “Ação Declaratória de 
Constitucionalidade”) was not included in the 
original wording of the Constitution of 1988. It     
was introduced by the 3rd Amendment to the 
Constitution, dated from 1993. Only federal 
normative acts can be in the object of an ADC, 
although the same authorities who can bring an 
ADIN before the Supreme Court are also competent 
21to bring an ADC.
The distinctive feature of the ADC is that its purpose 
is to demonstrate not the unconstitutionality of a 
normative act, but rather its compatibility with the 
Constitution. Since every court and every first 
instance judge has constitutional jurisdiction, 
sometimes the lower courts are overwhelmed with 
identical claims arguing against the constitutionality 
of a particular statutory provision. In Fiscal matters 
and issues related to State Pensions, the number of 
identical cases contesting the constitutionality of 
tributes or the criteria used by the Government to 
update state pensions can be alarming. In the     
year 2008, for instance, 46.94% of the new cases 
submitted to the Supreme Court (that is, 34.394 of 
the total of 73,221 cases submitted to the Supreme 
Court) dealt with Fiscal Law and Administrative Law 
22matters.
As established by federal law, the proponent of the 
ADC must indicate in the bill of complaint “the 
existence of relevant judicial controversy over the 
application of the provision which constitutes the 
23object of the Declaratory Action.”  The purpose of 
the action, as summarized by Minister Gilmar 
Mendes in an academic writing, must be the 
preservation of the presumption of constitutionality 
of the legislation, which can be threatened if there 
are a large number of decisions departing from the 
24norm.  It is a burden of the claimant to demonstrate 
that there is relevant judicial controversy over the 
constitutionality of the provision by quoting a 
substantial number of contradictory decisions from 
25different judicial bodies.  In this sense, the court 
has held that the claimant on the ADC must, at the 
time of filing the claim, demonstrate a “relevant 
proportion” of judicial disagreement. This view was 
justified by a reductio ad absurdum: such judicial 
disagreement must be strong enough to install a 
state of general lack of legal certainty, for otherwise 
the anticipatory rulings of unconstitutionality would 
mischaracterise the jurisdictional nature of the 
activity of the Supreme Court by turning the court 
into an organ of consultation, and thereby opening 
the way to the risk of undermining the balance of 
powers between the Legislative and the Judicial 
26Branches of Government.
In line with the purpose of increasing the degree of 
legal certainty and unifying the interpretation of the 
Constitution, there are some additional powers 
conferred to the Court. When assessing the 
procedural requirements of the ADC, the reporter 
judge may, if not satisfied with the decisions quoted 
by the claimant, request additional information to 
20 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: article 103, I to IX.
21 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: article 103, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th December 
2004.
22 Source: Official statistical database of the Federal Supreme Court, available at <http://www.stf.jus.br>.
23 Law number 9.868 of 10th November 1999: art. 14, III.
24 Gilmar Mendes, Jurisdicao Constitucional: o controle abstrato de normas no Brasil e na Alemanha, Sao Paulo: Saraiva, 1998, pp. 92ff. The same 
author also writes about this topic in Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.130.
25 See, in this particular, the jurisprudential directives stated in these two cases: STF, ADC 1, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 16-05-1995 and STF, 
MC em ADC 8, Rel. Min. Celso Mello, DJ de 04- 04-2003.
26 STF, MC em ADC 8, Rel. Min. Celso Mello, DJ de 04-04-2003.
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any other court or create a commission of experts to 
analyze evidence on the impact of jurisprudential 
27disagreements in the current state of the law.  
Furthermore, the Court may, by a collective 
judgment of the absolute majority of its members 
(that is, 6 out of 11 Ministers), issue restraint orders 
determining other jurisdictional bodies of the 
Republic (State Courts, Federal Courts, Labor 
Courts, Electoral Courts, Military Courts and first 
instance judges) to suspend the judgment of all 
cases regarding the application of the law or the 
28normative act under discussion.
c) The Direct Action against Unconstitutional  
Omissions
While the ADIN challenges a positive norm and is 
aimed at derogating unconstitutional legislative 
acts, the Direct Action against an Unconstitutional 
Omission (Omissive ADIN) deals with the inertia of 
the law-giver, that is, an “unconstitutional gap” in the 
29legal system.  The Constitution is deprived of its 
cogency by the lack of a normative act that should 
have already been passed by Congress.
There are, of course, several dilemmas which 
remain unsolved by the case law. If what 
characterizes the legislative activity is its 
continuous and intermittent character, how can one 
recognize an unconstitutional omission? If the court 
is prohibited by the democratic principle and by the 
principle of the rule of law to substitute the legislator 
when he remains negligent in concretizing the 
Constitution, what kind of efficacy can be attributed 
to a decision which recognizes an unconstitutional 
omission? If there is no procedure for coercively 
executing this decision, how can one expect         
the decision which recognizes an unconstitutional 
omission to be authoritative?
These questions are still unanswered and probably 
will remain for a long time. The Brazilian doctrine of 
the unconstitutional omissions follows the pattern of 
30the case law of the German Constitutional Court.  
In the academic literature, for instance, two types    
of unconstitutional omissions are recognized: 
complete and partial omissions. While a complete 
omission takes place when the legislator does not 
produce any law in spite of the fact that there is a 
genuine constitutional obligation of regulating  
some constitutional issue, a partial omission occurs 
when the legislative authority regulates a situation 
in an unconstitutional way because it does not  
cover a set of situations that should have been 
included in the statute. The classical case of partial 
unconstitutional omission is the concession of a 
benefit in detriment to the principle of equality. The 
law is unconstitutional because it fails to cover 
situations that should have been included in its 
31general hypothesis.
The number of omissive ADINs in Brazil is relatively 
low, and the tendency is that this number drops 
even further. As the Constitution gets older, a 
smaller number of matters referred to in its text are 
left completely unregulated. The trend is that the 
court should deal more with partial omissions than 
32with complete omissions.
As it happens with the ADIN, one may bring and 
omissive ADIN before the court not to uphold her 
own right, but rather to protect the juridical order as 
a whole. The object of the action is the integrity of 
the legal order, not any specific right. 
In general, the Supreme Court's case law on 
constitutional omissions can be classified as 
conservative. The court attributes heavy weight to 
the principle of democracy and to the principle of 
division of powers. The classic idea of a system of 
“checks and balances” recommends one to avoid 
any type of judicial activism when it comes to 
providing a remedy for unconstitutional omissions. 
27 Law number 9.868 of 10th November 1999: art. 20, § 1st and § 2nd.
28 Law number 9.868 of 10th November 1999: art. 21.
29 Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.077.
30 A comparative discussion on the topic can be found in Gilmar Mendes, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 1.177-1.204.
31 Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.201.
32 Ibid, p. 1.201.
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The court seems to incline itself towards the view 
that, in case of a complete absence of a regulation 
that is required by the constitution, the court should 
declare its unconstitutionality without pronouncing 
the nullity of any act and without issuing a direct 
order to the legislator. In this sense, the Court has 
held, in an omissive ADIN which intended to 
establish that the value of the minimum wage was 
unconstitutional because it could not supply for the 
satisfaction of the basic needs of a person, that 
while deciding an omissive ADIN the Supreme 
Court can do no more than notify the legislative 
body competent to remediate the omission, in order 
to it aware of the unconstitutionality and to enable it 
to regulate the matter required by the Constitution 
33without interference from the Justiciary.
In case of normative acts within the competence    
of the Executive, however, the Constitution 
establishes that the Court should give the 
Administrative authority a deadline of 30 days to 
34eliminate the omission.
As mentioned before, one of the difficulties of 
omissive ADINs is to determine when an 
unconstitutional omission is characterized. The 
Court has held that the general rule must be that if 
the legislative process has already initiated        
there can be no unconstitutional omission of the 
35legislator.  Nevertheless, more recent decisions 
hold that if the intertia deliberandi is unequivocally 
characterized and the delay amounts to negligence, 
the Court may pronounce an unconstitutional 
omission in spite of the existence of a bill under 
36discussion.  In a leading case in which it was 
demonstrated that there was a 10-year delay in 
enacting an act which was expressly required by  
the Constitution for the creation and the redefinition 
of territorial boundaries of Municipalities, the     
court held that there had been a breach of the     
duty to legislate and that the inertia deliberandi 
37could be challenged by an omissive ADIN.  This 
recent leading case is also important because it 
inaugurated the possibility to set a deadline for 
Congress to legislate: the Court ruled that the law-
giver should enact a statute, within 18 months of the 
publication of the decision, to eliminate the omission 
and to regulate retrospectively the facts occurred 
(and the political and administrative acts practiced) 
between the promulgation of the Constitution       
(or, to be more specific, the Amendment to the 
Constitution which established the duty to   
legislate) and the coming into force of the upcoming 
38regulation.
d) The Claim against the Disrespect to a 
Fundamental Precept
The Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental 
Precept of the Constitution (henceforth ADPF,      
for Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito 
Fundamental) is subsidiary to the ADIN and can be 
brought before the court by the same entities which 
are legitimized to bring the other types of direct 
39action.  Even though the ADPF was mentioned in 
the original wording of the Constitution of 1988 (and 
not merely introduced by an Amendment to the 
Constitution, as it happened with the ADC), it was 
not regulated until the coming into force of a law 
which was passed in December 1999. Because     
of its subsidiary character, it is only admitted         
when there is no alternative remedy to protect the 
40fundamental precept of the Constitution.
The ADPF is of significant importance because it 
makes it possible to protect the Constitution against 
acts which are left outside of the scope of the ADIN. 
The most obvious cases are municipal laws and 
normative acts which were in force before the 
41promulgation of the Constitution.  At the time of the 
coming into force of the statute which regulates the 
ADPF, there was a genuine social pressure for the 
33 STF, ADI 1439-MC, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello, DJ de 30-5-2003.
34 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil, art. 102, § 2nd.
35 STF, ADI 2.495, Rel. Min. Ilmar Galavao, DJ de 2-8-2002.
36 Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.187.
37 STF, ADI 3.682, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ de 06-09-2007.
38 Ibid.
39 Law number 9.882 of 3rd December 1999: art 1st.
40 Law number 9.882 of 3rd December 1999: art. 4th, § 1st.
41 Law number 9.882 of 3rd December 1999: art 1st, p. u., I.
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admittance of a direct action for adjudicating on the 
constitutionality of pre-constitutional and municipal 
laws.
Furthermore, the ADPF enabled the Court to  
assess the validity of acts that have always been 
excluded from abstract constitutional jurisdiction. 
Any normative act of a public authority can be 
challenged by an ADPF, including “interpretative 
42directives” issued by a court of justice.  In this 
sense, the sumulas of the Brazilian courts of justice 
might be submitted to a direct assessment of their 
43constitutionality.   A sumula (from Latin, Summula) 
is an abridgment of law which is relatively 
authoritative because it is enacted by a court of 
justice to publicize its own case law. Perhaps the 
closest equivalent to the sumula that one can find in 
European law is the Italian massima, which can be 
defined as “a very abstract statement representing 
the core of meaning of a legal rule, as it is 
44interpreted by the judgment considered.”  Sumulas 
are only edited after a set of repetitive decisions, 
and their enactment is preceded by a vote of the    
full panel of the court. Nearly all the courts in Brazil 
have repertories of their sumulas, and for obvious 
reasons jurists tend to attribute a great deal of 
45authority to them.
Finally, as Minister Gilmar Mendes has recently 
argued, the ADPF may be used to review 
administrative acts of regulation (regulamentos 
administrativos) which violate either the principle of 
Due Process of Law (which establishes “no one 
shall be deprived of her liberty or her property 
46without the Due Process of Law”)  or the principle of 
Formal Legality (which establishes that “no one 
shall be obliged to do or to refrain from something 
47unless by order of a law”).  In our opinion, however, 
the ADPF should be applicable to such normative 
administrative acts only when they are enacted by 
the Municipal administration, for in the case of 
federal laws or laws from the member-states of the 
Federation these acts are already covered by the 
48ADIN.
An opened question for Brazilian constitutional 
lawyers is which constitutional norms can constitute 
a parameter for and ADPF. What should the Court 
understand by a “fundamental precept”? In this 
topic, there is no final answer in legislation or in the 
case law. It would be recommendable to pass a law 
establishing a complete list of subjects that can be 
protected by the ADPF. In the absence of such 
legislation, however, the Court developed its own 
directives to define the fundamental character of a 
constitutional provision. After recognizing that it is 
“very difficult to delimitate, a priori, the fundamental 
precepts of the Constitution”, the Supreme Court 
held that at least the following group of norms       
are protected by the ADPF: (1) the Individual 
49Rights;  (2) those precepts which, by virtue of an 
explicit constitutional provision, can not be 
suppressed by an Amendment to the Constitution 
and therefore form the “immutable core” (clausulas 
50pétreas) of such Constitution;  and the so-called 
51“sensitive principles” of Federalism,  that is, the set 
of norms which if disrespected would authorize the 
interference of the Union in the competences of    
42 In this sense, although there is still no case law on this issue, I quote the opinion of Minister Gilmar Mendes in an academic writing, in which he 
argues that “it seems out of question” that a judicial act interpreting the constitution can be the object of an ADPF. See: Gilmar Mendes et alli, 
op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.161
43 In spite of the fact that the sumulas have a relevant degree of bindingness in Brazilian law, when the new statute was passed the case law of the 
Supreme Court was settled in the direction that they can not constitute to object of an ADIN, on the grounds that they lack the general 
characteristics of a normative act. See: STF, ADI 594, Rel. Min. Marco Aurelio, DJ de 15-04-1994.
44 Michele Taruffo, “Precedent in Italy” in E. Hondius (ed.), Precedent and the Law – Reports to the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law, Utrecht, 16-22 July 2006, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, p. 181.
45 For a short explanation in English of the force of precedents and sumulas in Brazilian law see: Thomas Bustamante, op. cit. (note 6).
46 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil, art. 5th, LIV.
47 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art 5th, II.
48 For the Minister's opinion, see: Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.168-1.170.
49 In the speech of the Reporter Judge, the court refers to the “individual and collective rights” enumerated at article 5th, I to LXXVIII of the 
Constitution. An opened question is whether the social rights and the labour rights should be considered “fundamental precepts” of the 
Constitution.There are arguments in both directions
50 Constituição de Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 60, § 4th. The immutable principles (clausulas petreas) are those who protect the 
Federative form of Government, the Separation of Powers, the Freedom on the General Elections and the Fundamental Legal Rights.
51 Constituição de Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 34.
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the States or the interference of the States in the 
52competences of the Municipalities.
2.2. Concentrated Constitutional Review by 
Concrete Claims
Further to the four types of abstract claims of 
unconstitutionality highlighted above, there are   
two special writs that are relevant for constitutional 
jurisdiction. The first one is the Writ of Injunction 
(Mandado de Injunção), which establishes a 
specific remedy for unconstitutional omissions 
when such omissions prevent the exercise of a right 
already established by the constitution. The second 
is the Writ of Mandado de Segurança, which is an 
action that can be brought against a public authority 
(be it a physical person or an administrative body) 
that by its illegal action keeps one from exercising a 
53legal right.  
These two actions, the Writ of Injunction and the 
Mandado de Segurança (when used to challenge a 
bill under discussion in one of the Houses of 
Congress), are a form of concentrated, although not 
abstract, constitutional review. It is concentrated 
because the jurisdiction is privative to the Supreme 
Court, but concrete because the writs are used to 
protect a right of the claimant, rather than the 
general integrity of the legal order.
a) A Mandado de Segurança (when used to contest 
an act within the legislative procedure)
The Mandado de Segurança (henceforth MS) is a 
type of constitutional action that is brought against a 
public authority in order to obtain an injunctive    
relief in the form of a court order restraining such  
authority from performing a particular act. The     
MS can be grounded either on a violation of 
constitutional norms or on a violation of ordinary 
statutory regulations. In the vast majority of cases, 
the incidental declaration of unconstitutionality 
within a MS does not differ from the rest of the 
diffused and incidental forms of judicial review,     
but in one specific case it does have a particular 
feature which transforms it into an instrument of 
concentrated constitutional review: the proponent 
of an MS may challenge the production of a general 
normative act. Any interested party is legitimised to 
sue the Governing Board of the Federal Senate or 
the Governing Board of the Chamber of Deputies in 
order to prevent the House from passing an 
unconstitutional act which would affect a liquid right 
55of the claimant.  By that procedure, the Supreme 
Court is empowered to interfere in the legislative 
process in order to knock down a bill by exercising a 
56preventive form of constitutional jurisdiction.
52 STF, ADPF 33-MC, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ de 06-08-2004.
53 The writ of Mandado de Segurança antedates the Constitution of 1988 by fifty years. It was introduced by the Constitution of 1934 and its main 
inspiration was the Writ of Mandamus, from the Law of the United States of America. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the MS and the Writ 
of Injunction have similar effects (they both may lead to a court order determining or restraining one from a particular action), they can be 
distinguished because while the latter is a remedy within the discretion of the courts, the former is a judicial action in which the courts have no 
discretion in enforcing the right of the claimant. For more on the Mandado de Segurança, see: Hely Lopes Meirelles, Mandado de Seguranca, 
30th edition updated by Arnoldo Wald and others, Sao Paulo: Malheiros, 2007.
54 Nevertheless, one cannot challenge the general effects of a law by an MS, for its efficacy is limited to the protection of a particular individual 
right. In this sense, there is an old Sumula which has been continuously applied by the court. See: STF, Sumula 266: “It is inadmissible to 
challenge a general law by a Mandado de Segurança” (this is not a literal translation. The canonical form of the sumula in Portuguese is: “Não 
cabe mandado de segurança contra lei em tese”). This sumula does not mean, however, that one can not deploy constitutional arguments in 
support of one's rights. As long as there is a liquid right in issue and as long as the effects of the decision do not extend beyond the individual legal 
relations of the case, the MS can be processed by the courts. The jurisdiction to adjudicate on a MS is determined by the territory over which the 
body which enacted the act challenged by the writ has authority. In case of an act of Congress, however, there is a constitutional provision 
attributing that competence to the Federal Supreme Court.
55 One of the distinctive features of the Mandado de Segurança is that it is a special procedure for protecting only “liquid rights.” A liquid right is 
understood in the relevant legal statutes (especially Law number 1.533 /1951) as a right which is based on uncontroversial factual 
circumstances. There can be no controversy over the “facts of the case” and the claimant must have unequivocal documental evidence. The 
circumstance of being brought against a bill in discussion by Congress turns the MS into a sui generic direct action, since the effects of the 
decision, instead of being inter partes, are generalized and become erga omnes once the act is nullified.
56 For some case law on the admissibility of the Mandado de Segurança for preventing an unconstitutional bill from being passed, see: STF, MS 
20.257, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 8-10- 1980; STF, MS-AgRg 21.303, Rel. Min. Octavio Galloti, DJ de 2-8-1991; STF, MS 24.356, Rel. Min. 
Carlos Velloso, DJ de 12-9-2003, as well as other subsequent decisions quoted in Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), p. 1.078.
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b) The Writ of Injunction (Mandado de Injunção)
The Constitution of 1988 established a large 
number of rights to be regulated by ordinary 
legislation. Nevertheless, there is a constitutional 
provision stating that all fundamental legal rights  
57are “immediately applicable.”  The constituent   
law-maker, in order to uphold the efficacy of         
the Constitution, created a new constitutional 
remedy named Writ of Injunction (Mandado de 
Injunção, henceforth MI). The MI is also a form of 
concentrated although concrete judicial review. 
One may bring an MI before the Supreme Court not 
in defense of the general integrity of the legal order, 
  but rather in defense of one's own rights.
Like the Omissive ADIN, the MI is a constitutional 
writ whose function is to break down the inertia of 
the legislator. The writ is admissible whenever the 
lack of a regulatory infra-constitutional norm “makes 
it impossible to exercise the civil liberties and 
fundamental legal rights or the prerogatives related 
58to nationality, sovereignty and citizenship.” 
The first leading case on the admissibility of the MI 
was decided merely one year after the promulgation 
of the Constitution of 1988. In this case (MI 107), the 
court held that the efficacy of a decision delivered in 
an MI is similar to that of an Omissive ADIN: the MI is 
an action which intends to obtain from the Justiciary 
a declaration of unconstitutionality of an omission in 
regulating a right, with a view of notifying the entity 
responsible for that regulation to take action, as it 
59happens with the Omissive ADIN.  The court was 
very firm in its conviction that it could not act as        
a “positive legislator”, in the lines of the classical 
60liberal view of Hans Kelsen.  No additive decisions 
either to integrate or to amend the legislation were 
admitted.
There are, however, some cases in which the court 
gave a broader scope to the procedural remedy of 
the MI.
In the MI 283, for instance, the court recognized a 
state of negligence of the Congress in regulating a 
norm established by the Temporary Provisions of 
61the Constitution.  That norm stipulates a duty to 
provide compensation for the victims of abuses 
committed by the military dictatorship via Secret 
Acts of the Ministry of Defense which banned a 
large number of people from exercising certain 
economic activities. Since the temporary provisions 
required the passing of a federal law to regulate the 
particulars of such compensation, the victims could 
not exercise their constitutional rights. In the light of 
this specific situation, the Supreme Court not only 
ruled that there was an unconstitutional omission, 
but also established a deadline of 45 days for       
the Congress to legislate. The Court determined, 
moreover, that in case the state of parliamentary 
negligence remained after that deadline, the 
applicant would be automatically entitled to claim 
compensation against the Union, in the form of the 
62general rules of the Civil Code.
In another relevant case, the Constitution 
guaranteed a fiscal privilege to beneficent 
institutions of social assistance, excluding them 
from taxation by contributions to the social security, 
“as long as these entities complied with the 
63conditions established in law.”  The Constitution 
has left to the ordinary legislator the task to 
discipline the conditions with which those entities 
should comply in order to claim immunity from the 
contributions.
Nevertheless, the Federal Government understood 
that such entities could claim no fiscal immunity until 
57 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil, art. 5th, § 1st.
58 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 5th, LXXI.
59 STF, MI 107-QO, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 21-09-1990.
60 Hans Kelsen, “La garantie juridictionelle de la constitution (La Justice constitutionnelle)”, Revue du droit public, 1928, pp. 197-257, also quoted 
in the General Report of this collective work.
61 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil – Ato das Disposições Constitucionais
Transitórias (ADCT): art. 8th, § 3rd.
62 STF, MI 283, Rel. Min. Sepulveda Pertence, DJ de 14-11-1991.
63 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 195, § 7
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Congress passed a law listing such conditions. The 
Supreme Court, after holding that there was an 
unjustifiable legislative omission, fixed a deadline of 
six months for Congress to pass a law eliminating 
that omission. Furthermore, it determined that if no 
law was passed until that deadline, the claimant 
would be automatically entitled to claim the fiscal 
64benefit.
In these two cases, the court took a step towards 
judicial legislation, albeit only with inter partes 
effect. That step, however, was of limited 
significance. In both cases the Constitution is very 
clear about the rights that are protected by its 
provisions. There is no doubt about the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional norms and it is very 
easy to understand the scope of the right which             
is determined by the Basic Norm. The reference           
to ordinary legislation can mean no more than            
the assertion the law-maker may, within a certain 
margin of appreciation, restrict or extend the 
protection of such rights. One could even say that 
the MI was not really needed in those cases, on the 
grounds that the Constitutional provisions in issue 
were immediately applicable, in spite of the fact that 
65the legislator might restrict them.
c)  Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction
In some recent decisions, the Supreme Course    
has made substantial changes in its case law by 
recognizing the possibility of additive decisions 
within a Writ of Injunction. In a claim (an MI) filed 
against the absence of a law regulating strike 
actions by public servants, the Court overruled in 
part its leading case (MI 107) concerning the limits 
of the judicial powers of filling in unconstitutional 
gaps. The Brazilian Constitution expressly 
contemplates among the fundamental labour rights 
the right to come out on strike, and has a specific 
provision requiring a federal law to lay down the 
particulars of strike actions within the public 
services. Nevertheless, nearly twenty years after 
the promulgation of the Constitution, no law had 
been passed regulating these matters. While the 
Government stated that its servants were not 
allowed go on strike until a statute fixing the limits 
and the conditions for exercising this right           
was enacted, the unions of workers and many 
leaders of labour organizations interpreted the 
aforementioned constitutional provision as 
establishing an unlimited or unconstrained right. In 
times of tension between the Government and       
its servants, the situation has reached a level   
where serious losses have been suffered by        
the population. In administrative bodies like the 
National Institute of Social Security, a multimonth 
strike has lead thousands of pensioners to        
suffer intolerable delays in receiving their pensions. 
Administrative claims of new benefits have been 
suspended and a large part of the population have 
been unable to claim benefits such as maternity 
leave or the allowance paid by the Government (in 
place of the salary) to people away from work for 
health reasons. As the Court held, the absence of a 
regulation on this issue has led to a sort of “state of 
nature” which has “serious consequences for the 
Rule of Law.” As Minister Gilmar Mendes expressed 
in his opinion, to leave the issue unregulated would 
amount to a sort of “judicial omission” in protecting 
66the Constitution.
On the face of this context, the Supreme Court 
pronounced the first additive decision – or at least 
the first admittedly additive decision – in the history 
of its case law. As opposed to the decisions on the 
MI 283 and the MI 232 – where it was ruled that a 
Constitutional right may be directly applicable in 
spite of the possibility of restrictive legislation only if 
its content can be directly determined by the 
interpretation of the constitutional text –, the Court 
decided to make positive regulations for a situation 
which was leading to serious social conflicts.     
After analyzing in detail the practice of additive 
64 STF, MI 232, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 27-03-1992.
65 In this sense, a prestigious part of the doctrine argues with plausible arguments that the remedy of the MI is unnecessary, since the 
Constitution establishes that the fundamental legal rights are immediately applicable and the methods of constitutional interpretation enable 
jurists to establish, in concrete cases, the sphere of applicability such rights. See: Luis Roberto Barroso, O controle de constitucionalidade no 
direito brasileiro, São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006, p. 112.
66 STF, MI 670, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ de 31-10-2008.
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decisions in the Italian tradition, the Court made 
express reference to the works of the Portuguese 
Professor Rui Medeiros, who admits additive 
decisions integrating legislation or yet when the 
regulation adopted by the court is “constitutionally 
67obligatory.”
The court decided thus to analogically apply the 
ordinary labour laws which regulate strike action in 
private labour contracts. Until further legislation is 
passed, public servants are subjected at least to the 
same rules that apply to ordinary workers as to the 
68abusive forms of strike action.
Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the 
impact of this new case in the state of the law. 
Arguments by analogy are a central feature to any 
legal system, and there is nothing original or 
particular to developed forms of constitutional 
review. The sole distinctive feature of this type of 
case law is that it constitutes an analogical decision 
with erga omnes effects, since it establishes a rule 
to be generally observed until legislative acts are 
passed. 
In spite of the general effect of its analogical 
decisions, the Court expressly insists that it is not 
acting as a “positive legislator”, but merely as the 
69“guardian of the Constitution.”
3. EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
3.1. Inter partes and erga omnes decisions
The distinction between inter partes and erga 
omnes effects of constitutional decisions provides 
the key criterion to distinguish the decisions of 
constitutional questions in concrete cases (that is, 
as an incidental question within a legal dispute)    
and in abstract constitutional actions (that is,    
claims detached from any case of application of the 
provision challenged by direct actions). 
As a rule, decisions of unconstitutionality – including 
the cases of “partial annulment of a legal norm 
without textual reduction” of a statutory provision 
(declaração de inconstitucionalidade parcial      
sem redução de texto) and the “interpretation in 
accordance with the Constitution” (interpretação 
conforme a Constituição) – pronounced in abstract 
or direct actions are erga omnes efficacious         
and have both a derogatory effect on the 
unconstitutional provision and a repristinatory   
effect on the legislation which was abrogated by   
70it.  Decisions on abstract constitutional actions     
do not resolve concrete disputes, but rather 
eliminate the statutes or the provisions pronounced 
as “unconstitutional.”
On the other hand, decisions of unconstitutionality 
within a legal dispute have inter partes effect and 
thus lack authority to derogate statutory legislation. 
Notwithstanding this, there is an ongoing discussion 
in the Supreme Court about the possibility of 
attributing erga omnes efficacy to incidental 
constitutional decisions that the Court might have 
adopted in concrete constitutional review. In a case 
in which only four of the eleven Ministers of the 
Federal Supreme Court have already delivered 
their judgments, some Ministers of the Court have 
argued that the system of constitutional review in 
Brazil has suffered a “constitutional mutation.” The 
Constitutional provision which requires that a 
Resolution of the Federal Senate should be passed 
in order to attribute erga omnes efficacy to a       
67 See, in this particular, the opinion of Minister Gilmar Mendes, which is transcribed in Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 1.214-1.219. 
See also, for a more developed account on the doctrine of additive decisions to which the Court adheres, Rui Medeiros, A Decisão de 
Inconstitucionalidade, Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 1999, pp. 301-318. In our opinion, however, the directive suggested above seems 
to be merely that additive decisions integrating legislation are admitted while additive decisions reforming legislation are not. When a norm is 
considered to be “constitutionally obligatory”, this seams to mean that this norm is determined by the Constitution, and therefore no additive 
decision is needed.
68 STF, MI 670, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ de 31-10-2008.
69 Ibid.
70 The pronouncement of unconstitutionality in abstract actions, in the face its repristinatory efficacy, implies the reestablishment of the norms 
derogated by the norm whose constitutionality is challenged by a direct action (RTJ 120/64 – RTJ 194/504-505– ADI 2.867/ES, v.g.). (…) Because 
the unconstitutional law is invalid (RJT 102671), it does not even have derogatory efficacy” (STF, ADI 2.215-MC/PE, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello, 
Informativo/STF n. 224).
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final decision of unconstitutionality laid down by    
71the Supreme Court  would have lost its juridical 
relevancy: once the system of judicial review 
developed in the direction of permitting the Court to 
72lay down a group of binding sumulas,  there would 
be no point in requiring a  resolution of the Senate   
to do something that the Court can now do by its      
73own authority.  If this interpretation prevails, a 
constitutional mutation implicitly derogating a 
particular Constitutional provision will be explicitly 
74recognized.
3.2. Binding and Non-Binding decisions
Further to the distinction between inter partes     
and erga omnes decisions; there is another   
relevant classification in Brazilian law with regards 
to the efficacy of judicial decisions about the 
(un)constitutionality of a provision. The 3rd 
Amendment to the Brazilian Constitution, from 17 
March 1993, established the rule that the decisions 
of the Federal Supreme Courts in ADINs and 
ADPFs have not only erga omnes efficacy, but are 
also binding upon all the judicial and administrative 
bodies of the Federal Union, the States and the 
75Municipalities.
More recently, another Amendment to the 
Constitution empowered the Federal Supreme 
Court to enact, by a decision of two thirds of its 
members and after a series of reiterated decisions 
about a constitutional issue, a special type of 
sumulas with binding efficacy over all the bodies of 
the Justificary and all the administrative authorities 
of the Federal, State and Municipal Governments. 
These sumulas differ from the ordinary sumulas of 
the Court and are explicitly named sumulas 
76vinculantes (binding sumulas).  The Court may 
decide to issue these sumulas on its own authority, 
but any of the parties legitimised to bring an ADIN 
before the Court can also request the promulgation, 
77revision and annulment of a binding sumula.  
These sumulas, as their own nomen iuris reveals, 
are also strictly binding.
Finally, a recent Federal Law attributed binding 
effects not only to the decisions of the Federal 
Supreme Court in ADINs, ADCs and binding 
78sumulas, but also to any decision in an ADPF.
The key difference between the erga omnes and  
the strictly binding effects of judicial decisions is that 
the latter means not only that a decision is 
applicable to all juridical relations, but also that there 
is a constitutional writ to guarantee the efficacy      
of such decisions. This constitutional writ is    
named “Complaint to Preserve the Competences of 
the Federal Supreme Court and the Authority         
of its Decisions” (henceforth Reclamação, for the 
Portuguese words “Reclamação para preservação 
da Competência do Supremo Tribunal Federal e 
79Garantia da Autoridade de suas Decisões).  Any 
party, in the course of any judicial or administrative 
dispute, may bring a Reclamação before the 
Federal Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may 
issue constraint orders and annul any judicial         
or administrative decision of any body of the 
80Republic.  In this case, and only in this case, there 
is a Brazilian equivalent of the technique of 
avvocamiento. 
71 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 52, X.
72 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 103-A.
73 For a discussion on the supposed “constitutional mutation” which would undermine article 52, X, of the Brazilian Constitution, see the Official 
Bulletin of the Court: Informativos n. 454 and 463, available at www.stf.gov.br.
74 For the opinion of Minister Gilmar Mendes, which is among the four judges who have delivered their votes, see: Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. 
(note 16), pp. 1.084-1.091. This opinion is particularly interesting because it is an enthusiastic defence of the claim that there has been in fact a 
derogatory constitutional mutation.
75 See now Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: art. 102, § 2nd, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th 
December 2004.
76 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th December 
2004. 
77 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, § 2nd, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th 
December 2004.
78 Law number 9.882 of 3rd December 1999: art. 10, § 3rd.
79 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: art. 102, I, “l.”
80 For a brief explanation of the Reclamações in Brazilian Law, see: Gilmar Mendes, “A reclamação constitucional no Supremo Tribunal Federal” in 
Marcelo Novelino Camargo, Leituras Complementares de Direito Constitucional, Salvador: Jus Podivm, 2nd ed, 2008, pp. 401-435.
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Here we have another situation where the Court 
clearly acts as a positive legislator. In effect, it can 
be argued that the efficacy of the binding decisions 
of the Supreme Court – and particularly the efficacy 
of a binding sumula – is equivalent to the general 
efficacy of the legislation, for these decisions – and 
especially the binding sumulas – establish the final 
81interpretation of the Constitution.
3.3. The scope of the binding effects of the 
decisions of the court
One of the most controversial problems of Brazilian 
Constitutional Law is whether it is admissible or not 
to challenge, by means of a Reclamação, a judicial 
decision which violates not only the ruling of a 
binding decision of the Supreme Court, but also its 
“justifying reasons” (fundamentos determinantes). 
In a case decided in October 2003, the Federal 
Supreme Court decided that the writ would            
be admissible in order to compel the lower courts    
to respect not only the concrete order which 
pronounces the unconstitutionality of a particular 
provision or establishes that it shall be interpreted   
in a particular sense, but also the motivation or      
82the ratio decidendi of a binding decision.  
Nevertheless, in spite of this decision of the plenary 
sitting of the court, there is still an ongoing 
discussion among its members over the thesis that 
the binding efficacy of a decision transcends        
the particular order laid down by the court and     
thus encompasses the reasoning or the general 
principles formulated to justify the conclusions        
83of the court.  There is no objective method for 
determining the ratio decidendi of the decisions of 
the court in ADINs, ADCs and ADPFs.
One thing seems to be certain. It is very unlikely that 
the Court will attribute binding effects to a decision 
which pronounces the constitutionality of a norm 
even when the parties offer new reasons which 
were not submitted to the court in the previous 
judgment. If one is able to put forward arguments 
which were not discussed by members of the     
court in a previous case that pronounced the 
constitutionality of a rule, there is no reason to 
believe that this rule will be “protected” from a claim 
of unconstitutionality on grounds not yet analyzed 
by the Court. The erga omnes and binding effects    
of the decision are thus merely of prima facie 
character. A decision that holds that a law X is 
compatible with the Constitution for the set of 
reasons R can always be challenged on the basis of 
the reason r1 if this reason does not belong to the 
set R. To put it more simply, a decision which 
establishes the constitutionality of a legal provision 
is valid with a sort of clausula rebus sic stantibus, 
since some social changes and newer juridical 
understandings of the matter analyzed by the court 
in the past might justify a change in the court's 
84doctrine.
3.4. Interpretative and reductive decisions by 
the Federal Supreme Court
In the speeches of the Ministers of the Federal 
Supreme Court, one can find express and recurrent 
references to many interpretative and reductive 
decisions, such as the technique of “interpretation   
in accordance with the Constitution”, the 
81 In spite of being the “final interpretation” of the Constitution, the binding decisions of the Federal Supreme Court find a limit, since they 
cannot bind the legislator. The authority of the binding constitutional decisions does not reach the Congress because the legislative body is still 
allowed to enact a new statute with the same wording of the previously annulated on the grounds of its unconstitutionality (STF, Rcl 2.617 AgR, 
Rel. Min. Cezar Peluso, DJ de 20.05.2005). Even though it is likely that this new text will also be challenged by a direct action of 
unconstitutionality, it might be the case that a constitutional mutation is recognized and the statute is validated. The writ of Reclamacao will be 
admitted only if the unconstitutionality of the new statute is pronounced in another binding decision.
82 STF, RCL 1.987, Rel. Min. Mauricio Correa, DJ de 21.04.2004.
83 See, for instance, the opinions already delivered in these two Reclamacoes: Rcl 2986, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello (Excerpt from the opinion of the 
reporter judge published at: STF: Informativo n. 379, available at <www.stf.jus.br>) and Rcl. 5470, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes (Excerpt from the 
opinion of the reporter judge published at STF: Informativo n. 496, available at <www.stf.jus.br>). These opinions are in line with the precedent 
from the Rcl. 1.987, quoted in the previous note. In a recent decision, however, the court has rejected, also by its plenary sitting, the thesis that 
the justifying reasons of a binding decision would also bind the lower courts and leave way to a Reclamação, on the grounds that the argument 
on which the claimant relied was no more than an obiter dictum (STF, Rcl 2475 Agr, Rel. Min. Marco Aurelio, DJ de 01.02.2008). It seems that the 
court still lacks a proper theory for determining which parts of their judgments are binding and
which are nothing but an obiter dictum.
84 Gilmar Mendes, op. cit. (note 22), p. 284.
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“pronouncement of partial unconstitutionality 
without textual reduction” and the pronouncement 
of “partial unconstitutionality with textual reduction.” 
These are all interpretative techniques of 
infraconstitutional laws. The decisions of the court 
in these situations have erga omnes efficacy and 
are absolutely binding upon lower courts, as long as 
they are pronounced within the context of an action 
whose decisions are characterized by these types 
of effects.
The interpretative decisions of the Federal 
Supreme Court, when issued in the context of 
abstract and concentrated constitutional review, are 
strictly binding upon all judicial and administrative 
85bodies.
A pronouncement of “partial unconstitutionality with 
textual reduction” is perhaps the most frequent of 
these methods. If a legislative provision, in the same 
paragraph or sentence, contemplates two or more 
alternative hypotheses, it might be the case that 
only one of them violates the Constitution. The 
unconstitutionality of the provision is partial 
because among the multiple facts covered by the 
abstract description of the norm, only a few make 
this norm unconstitutional. A reductive decision       
is one which “eliminates part of the linguistic-
uncontroversial core of the area of application of a 
86norm.”  
A pronouncement of unconstitutionality with textual 
reduction is thus one which eliminates some 
expression from the wording of a legal provision.     
In an abstract formula, the pronouncements of 
unconstitutionality with textual reduction of a norm 
can be described thus: “If a normative sentence S 
contemplates, in the conditions of application of the 
norm N, the facts C1, C2, …and Cn; and if Cn is 
considered to be incompatible with the Constitution, 
the court may revise the sentence C by eliminating 
Cn from the set of the conditions of application of N.” 
To quote an example, the Federal Supreme Court 
pronounced the unconstitutionality “with textual 
reduction” when a Federal Law regulating the 
activity of advocacy established that every 
advocate had “professional immunity” and thus “his 
speeches and manifestations in the exercise of his 
professional activities, either in or out of court”, did 
not amount to the crimes of “injury, defamation       
87or contempt.”  It was held that this provision       
was unconstitutional while it immunized lawyers 
from being persecuted by the crime of contempt. 
The court held that if lawyers were excluded from 
the scope of the criminal provision which punishes 
the “contempt of court”, the autonomy of the courts 
and the authority of their decisions would be 
seriously endangered, and therefore pronounced 
the unconstitutionality of the expression “and 
contempt”, albeit keeping in force the rest of the 
88legislative provision.  In the same case, many other 
provisions of the same statute were reduced in the 
same way, for the Court held that the advocates 
were immunized to such extent that these privileges 
could not find a justifying reason and violated, 
among others, the principle of equality before the 
89law.
A “pronouncement of partial unconstitutionality 
without textual reduction”, in turn, takes place when 
the legislative provision violates the constitution if 
interpreted in its literal or ordinary meaning. The 
court interprets a particular expression of the statute 
in a restrictive way in order to eliminate from the 
abstract norm that can be derived from the wording 
of the provision any sense which would collide     
with the Constitution. Instead of a principle of 
constitutional interpretation, this is considered        
to be a principle for the interpretation of the 
infraconstitutional legislation. Its function is to 
preserve the presumption of legitimacy of the 
legislation while avoiding maintaining in force 
unconstitutional readings of a statute. 
Even though some scholars attempt to differentiate 
the “pronouncement of partial unconstitutionality 
85 STF, Rcl 2.143 Agr, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello, DJ de 06.06.1993.
86 Aleksander Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification. Lund, 1983, p. 51.
87 Law number 8.906 of 4th July 1994: art 7th, § 2nd.
88 STF, ADI 1.127, Rel. Min. Paulo Brossard, DJ de 29.06.1994.
89 Ibid.
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without textual reduction” from the “interpretation    
in accordance with the constitution”, from the 
pragmatic point of view there is no difference 
between the two of them. To use a Kelsenian 
category, we can say that in both cases the court 
eliminates from the “frame” which defines the 
possible meanings of a lower-level norm those 
meanings that would make it incompatible with the 
constitutional norm which provides the basis of its 
validity. Whenever it is semantically possible, the 
court should interpret an infraconstitutional norm in 
a way that avoids the annulment of such norm. 
These methods of legal interpretation might, 
however, represent a threat to the accepted 
principle that the Court should always act as a 
negative legislator. When interpreting a statute     
“in accordance with the constitution”, the court 
recognizes and reasserts that it is strictly forbidden 
to extend the scope of a legal provision in such a 
way that would create a general norm not 
established by the law-giver. As the court defines    
it, the interpretation “in accordance with the 
Constitution” is a “technique of constitutional review 
which can not lead to a particular interpretation    
that falls outside of the range of hermeneutic 
90possibilities” left by the text a normative statement.  
It is inadmissible to apply this interpretative method 
whenever it is impossible to choose, among the 
possible meanings of the infra-constitutional norm, 
one which would eliminate the unconstitutionality. 
One can not avoid the pronouncement of 
unconstitutionality when the meaning of the norm is 
91undisputed.
3.5. The temporal effects of the decisions on 
constitutional matters (on direct actions of 
unconstitutionality) 
In Brazilian law, judges and courts generally 
consider themselves bound by the principle stated 
by Justice Marshall in Marbury vs. Madison: as a 
rule, unconstitutional laws are null and void and of 
92no effect.  The influence of the early decisions    
from the Supreme Court of the United States over 
the development of judicial review in Brazil is 
remarkable, probably due to the influence of the 
ideas of one of the greatest Brazilian jurists of         
all times, Rui Barbosa, who was a strong voice        
in defense of the civil rights in the country and       
one of the architects of the historical model of 
93constitutional review.
As it was held in a relatively recent case, “the natural 
order of things” directs itself towards the view that a 
decision pronouncing the unconstitutionality of a 
norm retroacts to the date of the issuance of the 
94norm considered to be unconstitutional.
Had the law-giver not passed statutory provisions 
explicitly authorizing the Supreme Court to lay down 
manipulative decisions, probably there would      
still be some resistance from the community of 
jurists against decisions with merely ex nunc or 
prospective efficacy. 
The current law is that decisions delivered in 
abstract and concentrated forms of judicial review  
of the constitutionality of laws normally have ex tunc 
or retroactive effects. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court may restrict the effects of the pronouncement 
of unconstitutionality of a law in order to deliver       
ex nunc or pro futuro decisions or even to determine 
that the pronouncement of unconstitutionality will 
produce effects only after a deadline to be set by   
the Court. The Court must comply with the following 
requisites while delivering such manipulative 
decisions: (i) there must be reasons of legal 
certainty or of (ii) exceptional social interest and, 
apart from that, (iii) the restriction or the exception to 
the retroactive efficacy of the decision must be 
established by a vote of at least two thirds of the 
95members of the Court (in its plenary sitting).
90 STF, ADI 3.046, Rel. Min. Sepulveda Pertence, DJ de 28.05.2004.
91 STF, ADI 1.344-MC, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 19.04.1996.
92 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
93 For a historical record of the system of judicial review of the constitutionality of the law in Brazil, with particular emphasis on the works of Rui 
Barbosa, see: Paulo Bonavides, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 6th edition, Sao Paulo: Malheiros, 1996, pp. 267-310.
94 STF, ADI 2.728, Rel. Min. Marco Aurelio, DJ de 05.10.2007.
95 See: Law number 9.882 of 3rd December 1999: art. 11; and Law number 9.868 of 10th November 1999: art 27.



























There is no doubt, therefore, that manipulative 
decisions with regards to the temporal efficacy       
of the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of a    
law are admitted in the Brazilian legal system. 
Nevertheless, it is a consensus that the courts 
should manipulate the temporal effects of the 
decision of unconstitutionality not on the basis of 
purely pragmatic reasons, but rather on strictly 
juridical reasons.
3.6. The temporal effects of the decisions on 
constitutional matters (on diffused decisions on 
constitutional matters)
In spite of the lack of an express provision 
authorizing the courts to restrict the retrospective 
efficacy of the decisions of unconstitutionality in 
diffused and incidenter tantum judicial review, the 
Supreme Court has broadened the scope of the 
permission established by article 27 of Law number 
9.868 of 19th November 1999. As a matter of       
fact, this provision, which authorizes the Court       
to limit the retrospective efficacy of decisions of 
unconstitutionality, is remarkably similar to the 
constitutional provision which, in the Portuguese 
96Republic, authorizes the same measures.  The 
same order of questions that were raised in Portugal 
is now opened to the Brazilian debate. The court 
decided thus to rely on the doctrinal interpretation 
dominant in that country. In interpreting the 
Portuguese constitutional provision, Prof. Rui 
Medeiros claims that the article 282nd (4th) of       
the Portuguese Constitution applies not only           
to concentrated constitutional adjudication, but 
equally to diffused judicial decisions of 
97unconstitutionality of statutes.
In consonance with this view, there are some 
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court admitting 
decisions pronouncing the unconstitutionality        
of laws with purely prospective efficacy even in     
the diffused and concrete forms of constitutional 
98jurisdiction.  The pronouncement of unconstitutio-
nality in concrecto can be limited if “another 
constitutional principle justifies the denial of the 
application of the principle of nullity”, that is, of the 
general rule that decisions of unconstitutionality 
99have retrospective efficacy.
In some exceptional cases, the Court has even 
admitted the so-called pronouncement of 
unconstitutionality without annulment of any 
concrete acts, on the grounds that the retrospective 
decision of unconstitutionality would itself violate 
the constitution to an extent even greater than 
would the maintenance of the unconstitutional acts 
(whose effects, in the particular case, could not be 
undone without serious losses to a large proportion 
100of the society).
3.7. Constitutional mutations
Constitutional mutations are also admitted in        
the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court.     
A “mutation” is understood as a change in the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision, the 
meaning of which is altered in spite of the 
maintenance of the same wording of the 
Constitution. If it were not for the binding efficacy of 
some constitutional decisions, there would be 
nothing special about “constitutional mutations” to 
distinguish them from the general practice of 
overruling. Because of the general effects of such 
changes, in some very exceptional cases the    
Court has applied the technique of “prospective 
overruling” in order to avoid retrospective changes 
101in the law that would cause social disruption.  The 
general rule, however, is to avoid this technique and 
not to apply it unless there are very strong reasons 
advanced by the parties. 
96 Constituição da Republica Portuguesa, art 282 n. 4.
97 Rui Medeiros, A Decisão de Inconstitucionalidade. Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 1999, p. 743-4.
98 STF, Informativo n. 418, fonte: sitio da Internet <www.stf.gov.br>.
99 STF, HC 82.959/ES, Rel. Min Marco Aurelio, DJ de 01.09.2006 (See, for instance, the opinion of Min. Gilmar Mendes).
100 STF, RE 442.683-8, Rel. Min. Carlos Velloso, DJ de 24.03.2006
101 Supremo Tribunal Federal, HC 82.959/SP, Rel. Min. Marco Aurelio, DJ de 01.09.2006.
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CONCLUSION: 
THE IDEA OF THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR
The analysis of the Brazilian case law in this report 
has shown that the idea that the Supreme Court 
should act as a “negative legislator”, and not as a 
“positive” law-maker, is deeply entrenched in the 
ideology of the Brazilian legal system. We have 
seen, however, that as a matter of fact there is a 
significant range of situations in which the Court 
does act as a positive legislator in spite of its official 
discourse. Is this a contradiction? How should we 
reconstruct the ideal and the factual interpretations 
of the thesis that courts are “negative legislators”, 
with particular reference to the Brazilian Supreme 
Court? 
In our view, the idea of the negative legislator can be 
reconciled with the normative powers held by the 
Constitutional Court. When the Court expressly 
asserts that its competences do not authorize it       
to lay down general norms and thus act as a 
“positive legislator”, it is making a normative claim 
and establishing for itself a general obligation to    
respect the authority of Congress. This obligation is 
connected to an ideal aspect of the judicial practice. 
This aspect can be characterized as a “regulative 
ideal.” The function of this ideal is the same function 
of the ideal assumption that there is always a 
“correct answer” to any legal dispute. This idea, 
suggested by Ronald Dworkin in Law's Empire, is 
relevant to legal practice because it amounts to the 
existence of an “interpretative principle” which 
requires judges to justify their decisions in the best 
possible way, “as if” there was always a single 
102correct answer.  It is a duty to judicial authorities 
which commands them to seek for the “correct 
answer” and to struggle to justify their decisions in 
the most rational way within the possibilities opened 
by the law. The ideal of the negative legislator has 
an analogous function. In effect, it is a theoretical 
construction closely connected to Hans Kelsen's 
strong democratic convictions. In the activity of 
adjudication, the judge should concretize the 
Constitution by individualizing its norms.
The idea of a negative legislator is by no means 
incompatible with the idea that the courts have 
authority to create concrete norms on the basis of 
the general norms laid down in the Constitution. To 
the Justiciary it is expressly recognized authority to 
enact interpretative norms in order to assure the 
impartial application of the Constitution. One could 
never question, however, that in several occasions 
this normative powers amount to a (partial) 
decentralization of the legislative function. Even 
though the norms produced by the judges are still 
concrete and individual if compared with the broad 
principles incorporated in the Constitution, they still 
hold a great deal of generality. Kelsen would hardly 
doubt that.
Nevertheless, the ideal of the “negative legislator” 
remains plausible. This ideal is a normative claim 
which establishes that judges should respect the 
competences of the ordinary legislator and adopt a 
sort of “judicial self restraint”, as long as it is possible 
to do so. If this is the correct interpretation of the 
idea that judges are “negative legislators”, then     
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court is strongly 
committed to this ideal, in spite of its general 
normative competences.
102 100 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 11th printing, 2000.
